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Abstract
Hong Kong’s “One Country, Two Systems” government regime will end by 2047and it will
promote the country’s integration into the People’s Republic of China (PRC). To ensure a
smooth transition, by eliminating the border and other forms of geographic barriers that separate
the two countries, the PRC has been issuing measures to promote integration. However, despite
on-going practices of integration, Hong Kong continues to strengthen its border with China
through infrastructural and bureaucratic means, reinforcing a British-colonial era border regime.
Thus, my research focuses on this contradiction between the elimination and reinforcement of
the Hong Kong-China border as an attempt to understand the socio-political forces that have
produced this dynamic. Analysing the historical conditions that have produced the Hong KongChina border regime through the lens of material and visual culture, I have come to the
conclusion that Hong Kong continues to invest in the border as a political strategy to resist
Mainlandization so that its autonomy continues to be preserved.
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Introduction
On January 6, 2018, the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) State Council approved
Guangdong’s request to demolish the physical border which divides the Shenzhen Special
Economic Zone from Hong Kong. The decision was made to promote integration between
Mainland China and Hong Kong. The border between Shenzhen and Hong Kong is delineated
with an 84.6 mile iron fence along the Shenzhen (or Shun Chun) river, the natural boundary
dividing the two geographic bodies (Leung, 2018). While this decision is symbolic of the PRC’s
expansion of sovereignty into Hong Kong territory in response to the expiration of Hong Kong’s
border with the PRC in 2047, events like these are calling into question Hong Kong’s status as an
autonomous body -- one that consists of its unique set of laws, values, and culture distinct from
those of mainland China.
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Hong Kong’s existence as a distinct country was legitimized after the Sino-British Joint
Declaration was signed on December 19, 1984 (Constitutional and Mainland Affairs Bureau).
Between 1842 and 1997, Hong Kong was a British crown colony. However, Hong Kong was
officially handed over back to China after the declaration was signed. This negotiation
established the “One Country, Two Systems” government regime, allowing Hong Kong to retain
its current economic and political systems under the jurisdiction of the PRC. Basic Law, or Hong
Kong’s unique constitution, was also established. Therefore, Hong Kong is now essentially able
to operate autonomously under Chinese rule as a Special Administrative Region (SAR).
However, since this “One Country, Two Systems” regime is expected to expire in 2047, Hong
Kong’s autonomy is being threatened by the PRC’s efforts to integrate Hong Kong into mainland
China.
The process of Hong Kong’s integration into the PRC, colloquially called
“Mainlandization” (Tsung-gan, 2017), is occurring through recent infrastructural developments
that transcend natural international borders. Just two months ago, the Hong Kong-Macau-Zhuhai
bridge - a bridge that connects the three-regions to one another - opened to the public (Griffiths,
2018). Similarly, the West Kowloon railway station opened in September. It is the only terminus
in Hong Kong where a high-speed bullet train can be taken to different parts of mainland China
(Chung, 2018). By observing these new developments, one can see how the PRC is making
strides to expand its influence into Hong Kong.
While the natural border separating Hong Kong and the PRC is being dismantled both in
its physicality and its geographic proximity to the mainland, the government of Hong Kong
continues to fortify its existing border control points. Lo Wu (or Luohu) Control Point, the
busiest border crossing point in Hong Kong, has evolved from being an outdoor crossing-bridge
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into a complex institution governed by high surveillance and strict border regulations. According
to the Hong Kong Immigration Department’s 2016 annual report, Hong Kong’s border-crossing
points have made impressive strides on safety and cross-border migration efficiency. It boasts
about its technological advancements in implementing cutting-edge border technologies, and its
achievements in reducing crime rates. The report also provides insight into the complex
bureaucracy of the Hong Kong Immigration Department, where its array of border branches are
briefly described. Thus, these advancements are testament to Hong Kong’s interest in its borders
with the mainland.
It is the contradiction between the PRC’s efforts to erase its natural borders with Hong
Kong and Hong Kong’s continuous investments in its border ports that poses a range of
questions. Why does Hong Kong continue to invest in the development of the border if the
border will expire in 2047? How does the PRC’s efforts in dismantling the natural border
through the bypassing of geographical restrictions come into conflict with Hong Kong’s efforts
to protect it? What does this mean for Hong Kong’s political and economic sovereignty? Thus,
my research explores this contradiction expressed by the simultaneous creation and destruction
of Hong Kong’s natural borders with the PRC in an attempt to provide some insights into the
questions I have posed.
This contradiction will be unpacked by concentrating on Hong Kong’s history during and
after British-colonial rule, and I would use its geopolitical context to draw connections between
the then and now. More specifically, I observe Hong Kong’s border regime with mainland China
and its wider political implications through the lens of material culture and spatial practices.
Drawing from scholarly work produced by experts in Hong Kong’s history and investigating
20th-century photographs taken in Hong Kong, I have come to the conclusion that Hong Kong
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continues to invest in its border with China, despite its expiration in 2047, as a political strategy
to protect and preserve its autonomy as a political, economic, and social geographic body that is
distinct from China’s.
It is imperative to emphasize that this study geographically frames Hong Kong as an
island - one that is delineated by natural boundaries and coastal edges. The island of Hong Kong,
which spans a total of 427.8 square miles (Central Intelligence Agency), should not be confused
with “Hong Kong Island”, which is a separate geographic body, albeit under the State of Hong
Kong, that is located in the Southern-portion of Hong Kong. Thus, I focus on both the natural
border between Hong Kong and China delineated by the Shenzhen River, as well as the manmade borders between the two political bodies.

Map of the Hong Kong-China border, illustrated by the black line. (Danielewicz-Betz & Graddol, 2014)
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Historical Context
To understand the evolution of Hong Kong’s border regime, it is important to underscore
the significance that war and conquest had on its initial development. Hong Kong’s entry into the
international stage can be traced back to the First Opium War (1839-1842) between the British
and China, to which Hong Kong was under Chinese rule at the time. After losing the war, China
ceded Hong Kong to the British and the Treaty of Nanking was signed on August 29, 1842,
which officially marked Hong Kong as a British crown colony. The British, however, were not
satisfied with the conditions laid out by the Treaty, claiming it didn’t promise the wealth and
prosperity that controlling Hong Kong’s ports would offer. Thus, the Second Opium War broke
out in the 1850s, and it resulted in the colony’s expansion into the Kowloon Peninsula. The
Treaty of Tientsin, signed in June 1858, codified the colony’s expansion into China, opening 10
more Chinese ports to trade and providing Western missionaries access to the Chinese hinterland
(Carroll, 2007, pp. 13-23). The colony expanded again after the British acquired the New
Territories, the 365-mile rural territory spanning between Kowloon and the Shenzhen River.
During the Second Convention of Peking on June 9, 1898, the British negotiated a lease with
China in which the British were given the New Territories for 99-years - a lease that would
expire in 1997. The land was used by the British as military training grounds and real estate
development (Carroll, 2007, p. 67). Thus, the expansion of the former British colony up to the
Shenzhen River set the stage for border conflicts to ensue.
The conditions that propagated Hong Kong’s border regime intensified during the
Japanese occupation of Hong Kong. During the Sino-Japanese war in 1941, Japanese troops
entered Hong Kong through the Shenzhen River border and wreaked havoc on the British
military. After the British military surrendered in their battle against the Japanese, the Japanese
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remained in Hong Kong and took control of the colony for almost four years under martial law.
These four years marked a brutal period of history characterized by violence and rape in Hong
Kong. As a result of these atrocities, the population in Hong Kong fell by half since many Hong
Kongers either fled the country or died. It was not until August 30, 1945 when Japan finally
surrendered and handed over Hong Kong back to the British (Carroll, 2007, pp.119-123). Thus,
the Japanese occupation destabilized Hong Kong and created an environment of fear that would
encourage a greater British military presence along the Shenzhen river border to ensure that the
colony is protected from outside military forces.
The years following the Japanese occupation of Hong Kong was marked by a period of
open borders and improved economic relations between China and Hong Kong. During this time
period, Hong Kong’s border was open to facilitate free trade with the mainland and the rest of
the world. However, it wasn’t until 1949 when the border militarized and closed in response to
Chinese refugees. In 1949, the Chinese Civil War broke out between the Communist Party and
the Nationalist Party (the Kuomintang), in which the Communists won. Due to the fear that the
rise of Communist power instilled in the Chinese population, thousands of Chinese fled the
country and migrated into Hong Kong. Given that the border remained open at the time, the
British Colonial government allowed Chinese refugees to freely pour in under the assumption
that the situation was temporary and that they would eventually return to the mainland once its
political situation pacified. However, from November 1949 to December 1949, more than
210,422 refugees migrated into the colony (Madokoro, 2012, pp. 410-412). In response to the
massive influx of refugees, the British decided to close its border with China because they were
afraid that the colony was oversaturated with unskilled laborers who would damage the economy
(Smart and Smart, 2008, p. 181). Likewise, because this occurred during the Cold War era, the
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British wanted to prevent any Communist-influence into their colony. Thus, to signify the
closure of the border and to keep migrants from freely crossing it, a fence was constructed along
the Shenzhen River. This is the first instance of a physical demarcation between the two entities,
and the beginning of its increased militarization and surveillance (Madokoro, 2012, p. 412).
While the Shenzhen river border technically remained closed during the 1950s, border
activity still continued. Native Hong Kongers would pass in and out of the country to visit family
and purchase goods in the mainland. Illegal cross-border activity also thrived at the time, which
led to an increased presence of security at the border. However, the refugee situation remained
stable up until the spring of 1962, when over half a million Chinese refugees were marching into
Hong Kong through the Shenzhen river border. The Chinese refugee caravan entering Hong
Kong was due to the hostile conditions that the Great Leap Forward, Mao Zedong’s initiative to
industrialize the country under a collectivization regime, created in China. Thus, to deter
refugees from entering the country, the British dispatched military soldiers and police officers to
the Shenzhen River border, where 17, 656 Chinese migrants were arrested. In addition, seventy
five of refugees attempting to enter Hong Kong were sent back to the Mainland through violent
measures such as deportations, expulsions, and physical force. Because the border situation
became too much for the British to regulate, they had no choice but to ask the PRC for
assistance, in which the PRC sent military personnel to their side of the border. Thus, given that
the British produced hostile conditions at the border, mainlanders did not see Hong Kong as a
place of refuge anymore (Madokoro, 2012, pp.416-418).
The border further militarized in 1967 following the Leftist riots that broke out across
Hong Kong. Inspired by China’s Cultural Revolution, leftist Hong Kongers coalesced and
organized protests resisting British colonial rule. Border ports, in particular, became active
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spaces of confrontation for these protests to occur. Therefore, in response to the increased
political activity at the Hong Kong-China border, the British and Hong Kong deployed more
police officers and soldiers there. Additionally, the Hong Kong government took legal measures
to restrict migration and access to the border by implementing tighter border controls that made
it even more difficult for Hong Kong people and the Chinese to cross. Likewise, an additional
fence was erected at the Lo Wu Control Point as an extra barrier of protection. It was constructed
in response to the violent incidents that occurred there between law enforcement and protesters.
However, since Hong Kong authorities sought it necessary to secure the entirety of the Shenzhen
river border as opposed to solely a small portion of it, a thirty-foot wide fence was constructed
along the river. Therefore, to ensure that these new barriers are protected, military and police
officers have been permanently dispatched at the border (Madokoro, 2012, pp. 420-422).
While the restrictions at the border remained stringent, Hong Kong opened up its borders
again to trade with China after 1978. After Mao Zedong died in 1976, Deng Xiaoping took
control of the PRC. Implementing the Open Door Policy and other neoliberal economic reforms,
China entered the international economic arena (Smart et al., 2007, p. 183). Thus, the British
opened up Hong Kong’s border ports to facilitate commodity flow with China. Border controls
became further complicated in 1984, when the Sino-British Joint Declaration was signed.
After Hong Kong was officially handed over back to China in 1997, border controls were
imperative in maintaining the “One Country, Two Systems” regime. In terms of immigration,
cross-border migration has become asymmetrical. While Hong Kong citizens are now able to
cross the border into China without any restrictions, mainland Chinese citizens must obtain a
visa prior to entering Hong Kong. Nonetheless, after 1997, the Hong Kong-China border
continued to fortify and securitize in response to technological and economic advancements.
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Cutting edge border technologies such as the Automated Passenger Clearance Systems, and
smart Hong Kong ID cards containing biometric information have been installed at the Lo Wu
Control point to manage cross-border migration more efficiently. Additionally, Hong Kong is
one of the China’s biggest importers, dependent on the Mainland for food provision. Thus,
careful inspection at the border is necessary to regulate and secure the flow of commodities and
to ensure the safety of imported food. Additionally, border surveillance has significantly
increased in response to public health crises. The Avian flu outbreak in 1997, as well as the
SARs (severe acute respiratory syndrome) outbreak in 2003, led to deaths of many in Hong
Kong and the populations of its trading partners (Smart et al., 2007, pp. 189-190). Therefore, in
addition to the increased militarization, technological development, and securitization of the
border, screening and surveillance also expanded to prevent lethal diseases from spreading.

An Analysis of the Sha Tau Kok Border Control Point and its Relationship to the Hong
Kong Border Regime
To understand the Hong Kong-China border regime on a grassroots level, I would show
the Sha Tau Kok border crossing by unpacking the photos taken there. Located inside the
Frontier Closed Area (FCA), the Sha Tau Kok border crossing point is the least used control
point to enter mainland China. Sha Tau Kok is historically known to be a small rural border
village. Designated as an FCA by the Hong Kong government, people are restricted to enter the
space unless special permission is given. However, Shau Tau Kok is still home to fishing and
farming communities of Hakka descent, remaining a traditional town that is untouched by
outside forces (David, 2012). However, its border tells a different story.
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Figure 1

Sha Tau Kok border before the 1950s, as delineated by the rock on the lower-left corner (Forman, 1949)

Taken by Harrison Forman (Figure 1) , an American photojournalist for the New York
Times, this photo depicts Sha Tau Kok back in the 1950s. More specifically, this photo is taken
on Chung Ying Street, which translates to China England Street. The stone on the lower-left
corner of the photograph is the border crossing point that separates the Chinese territory from the
British territory. The stone is located in the center of Chung Ying Street, dividing the street
equally into their respective territories. This stone is coined the “Anglo-Chinese boundary stone”
because it was strategically placed here by the British in 1889, after the British acquired the New
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Territories, to delineate its territory with China (Emily and Michelle and Olivier, 2013). This
land boundary was placed in the middle of the street by J.H.S Lockhard and Huang Tsun-hsin
due to a disagreement over whether the Chinese or the British should exercise ownership over
the village (Kelly, 1987, pp.39-40).
Observing this photograph, one can notice the two British guards are leisurely standing
around the building behind the right side of the boundary stone. Based on their location, I would
assume that the British territory is to the right of the stone. The British guards are dressed in
casual Hong Kong military attire, wearing clothing that exposes their arms and legs. Based on
what they are wearing, there does not seem to be any immediate threats to the space. Moreover,
the British guard without the sunglasses looks like he’s carrying a baton on his black belt. The
British guard with the sunglasses, however, seems to not be carrying any weapons. The lack of
machinery on them, once again, reinforces the lack of danger the area posits.
The casual attire and the lack of machinery on the British guards calls into question the
magnitude of the border point’s political significance. As mentioned earlier, the 1950s was a
time when borders were being increasingly militarized and policed in response to the influx of
mainland Chinese refugees pouring into Hong Kong. However, looking at the photograph of the
Sha Tau Kok border crossing point, this migration pattern doesn’t seem to exist. There is no
large crowd of people, nor is there any concentrated human activity depicted in the photograph
that would indicate an occurring of any refugee crisis.
Nonetheless, the lack of British guard personnel surrounding the Sha Tau Kok border
point indicates that this crossing point is not heavily used by migrants. This makes sense given
its geographic location astray from the Shenzhen River - the natural boundary where main
immigration points such as Lo Wu and Lok Mau Chau are located. Additionally, because the
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border crossing point literally exists in the middle of the road separating the colony from China,
the subjectivity of a “Chinese refugee” is blurred, given that Chinese residents can freely cross
the invisible border without needing to go through screening or security. The stone’s seemingly
arbitrary location makes it difficult to determine if Chinese residents who live on Chun Ying
Street are even recognized by the PRC as Chinese citizens.
Essentially, the lack of military defense depicted in this photo implies that during the
1950s, border surveillance had yet to be formalized into a significant institution. The case of Sha
Tau Kok must be taken lightly, however, given its exceptional nature as being a border entry
point that is not along the Shenzhen River.

Figure 2

Hong Kong soldiers (left) and PRC soldiers (right) walking side-by-side (Gwulo, 1997)

Figure 2, taken by an unknown photographer, was captured in 1997, after the British
officially handed over their former colony Hong Kong back to China. This photograph is a more
modern depiction of Chung Ying Street and the border crossing stone. Compared to the
photograph of the stone taken in the mid-20th century, one can observe the differences within the
urban landscape. What once looked like a humble, traditional village town now looks more
modern and vibrant. To the left of the border stone are two Hong Kong military soldiers, and to
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the right are two PRC military soldiers -- as promptly identified based on their attire. Based on
the placement of the soldiers, it is safe to assume that the left side is Hong Kong territory while
the right is PRC territory. Looking at the side of PRC territory, the newly erected wall lined with
different colored flags may be a landmark of Chinese sovereignty of the space.
While it was noted in Figure 1 that the right side of the boundary stone is British territory,
that doesn’t necessarily mean that the right side of Figure 2 is now Hong Kong territory. It could
be that Figure 2 was taken in front of the boundary stone rather than behind, or vice versa, which
would change the orientation of the two territories. However, based on the outfits that the
soldiers are wearing in Figure 2, it is safe to assume that the right side of the stone (only in the
context of Figure 2), is the Chinese territory.
Nonetheless, this photograph is a literal manifestation of the “One Country, Two
Systems” on a local level, giving insight into how Mainland China is expanding its influence
over Hong Kong territory post hand-over. After Hong Kong was handed over back to China,
Chung Ying Street was designated by the government of Hong Kong as an FCA, in which Hong
Kong citizens, to this day, are not allowed to enter this space unless a permit is administered to
them by the government. A permit can only be received if Hong Kongers have family members
who still live in the Sha Tau Kok village. This is not the case for the PRC, however, in that
Chung Ying Street has become a tourist hub for mainlanders. While the street is still restricted to
mainland Chinese citizens, permits to enter can be easily purchased for 10 RMB. Due to the
influx of Chinese tourists entering Chung Ying Street, the street has become commercialized.
Shopping malls, and a historical museum, have opened up on the street (Michelle et al., 2013).
This phenomenon is significant in the context of the Hong Kong-China border regime in that the
boundary stone delineating the division between Hong Kong and China has officially lost its
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political significance as a border marker. Because Hong Kong is now under the federal
jurisdiction of the PRC, Chun Yin Street has technically become China’s property. And given
that there are less restrictions for Mainland Chinese to enter Chun Ying Street compared to the
restrictions on Hong Kongers, the asymmetrical access to the space illustrates the PRC’s subtle
coercion of power over Hong Kong territory -- thus manifesting the “Mainlandization” effect.

Figure 3

Sha Tau Kok border before the 1950s, depicted by the boundary stone (Forman, 1949)

Figure 4

Sha Tau Kok border in 2015, depicted by the fortified control point (Cheung, 2015)
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The last two photos I will be analyzing and comparing are the Sha Tau Kok border point
in the mid-20th century (Figure 3) and the Sha Tau Kok Control Point now (Figure 4). As one
can see, while the two border points depicted share the same function of delineating boundaries
between Hong Kong and China, they look nothing alike. While the border between the former
British colony and China is ambiguously delineated by the boundary stone in the left photo, the
border between Hong Kong and China in the right photo is depicted as a formalized control point
- one with customs agents, toll booths, and conventional border infrastructure. Cross-analyzing
these two photos provides a deep insight on how the natural Hong Kong-China border has been
fortified and militarized under the State.
As mentioned above, the border crossing stone separating China and Hong Kong has lost
its political significance after Hong Kong was handed over back to China. Even though the stone
does not signify a formal border -- one represented by fencing or walls -- between the two
entities, a Sha Tau Kok border still exists. The Sha Tau Kok Control point now, illustrated in the
right photo, is located close, but outside of Chun Ying Street. What this literally indicates is that
the border between the two countries has been arbitrarily moved to a different location. The most
practical reason as to why the border could have moved to its current location is that it is closest
and most easily accessible to Guangdong, China. Looking at the photo on the right, the high-rise
buildings that exist beyond the control point illustrate the city of Tianen - a city in Guangdong.
Thus, it could potentially be that this control point provides the fastest access to the city center of
Tianen. However, there is not information available on this control point to fully grasp the main
reason.
As previously mentioned, there were no physical barriers that separated the two sides of
Chun Ying Street in the mid-20th century. Depicted in the left photo, the rock stands in the
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center of the road, with the same amount of urban development on either side. Because there is
no fencing and border patrol agents in sight, the lady in the black is able to freely migrate across
the border. Given that Sha Tau Kok is a unique exception to the politicization of border control
points along the Shenzhen River in the 1950s, it is clear that the border stone held no tangible
geopolitical significance in which cross-boundary mobility was not the main concern for military
personnel deployed there at the time. However, this is not the case in the present, in which the
creation of a formal control point at the Hong Kong-China border has political and legal
connotations. Because the control point is located in the FCA, a Closed Road Permit is necessary
if drivers want to cross the border (Hong Kong Transport Department, 2018). Cross-boundary
car and bus services authorized by the Hong Kong government are also available if travelers
want to cross the border using public transportation. This institutionalization of transportation
across the Sha Tau Kok border is an example of how politicized the border is now, in that the
State regulates and controls all activity that occurs there through an increase in bureaucratic
practices. Likewise, the creation of a formal border port is also necessary for the Hong Kong
government to legitimize its boundaries as an autonomous entity separate from China,
reinforcing the “One Country, Two Systems” regime.

Conclusion
Analyzing the history of the Hong Kong-China border regime from pre-Colonial British
rule to post-Colonial British rule, and unpacking its nuances through my analysis on the Sha Tau
Kok border, I have come to a variety of conclusions. The first conclusion is that the Hong KongChina border became politicized due to the migration of Mainlanders into Hong Kong. Within
the context of World War II and the Cold War, the social and political conditions produced in
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mainland China has resulted in massive influxes of refugees into Hong Kong which lead to the
beginning stages of border militarization and fortification. The second conclusion of this study is
that while war and conquest set the foundation for the Hong Kong-China border regime to exist,
it is the radical changes in history that has propagated the development and advancement of the
border. Changes such as the decolonization of Hong Kong and the creation of a “One Country,
Two Systems” government regime has given the border a new meaning. What once was a natural
boundary between two regions, has now become a frontier that separates two distinct political
and economic systems from one another. The final conclusion, encompassing the previous
conclusions, is that the PRC will continue to exercise their power in different ways -- subtle and
blatant - to ensure that by 2047, Hong Kong will be completely integrated into China. Whether
it’s through the creation of new cross-national bridges and public transportation or the arbitrary
relocation of the border at Sha Tau Kok, the PRC is taking direct measures to dismantle its
border with Hong Kong. However, despite the PRC’s actions to integrate Hong Kong, Hong
Kong continues to make efforts to protect its border, and thus, its identity as a distinct
autonomous body.
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